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Abstract  
Mainstream psychology can often be criticized for turning the liberal concerns of 
psychologists into conservative practices focusing on the individual. In the United 
Kingdom, the discursive turn in social psychology has been marked by an audacious 
body of work critical of cognitive attempts to theorize the social. A particular psycho-
discursive strand has emerged, which combines discourse analysis and psychoanalytic 
theory in an attempt to change both the subject of, and the subjectivity (re)produced by, 
mainstream psychology. This paper reviews three different psycho-discursive 
approaches: (i) Hollway and Jefferson’s Free Association Narrative Interview method; 
(ii) Billig’s Psychoanalytic Discursive Psychology; (iii) Parker’s Lacanian excursions 
into social psychology. In these psycho-discursive approaches, ‘subjectivity’ replaces 
personality as the key theoretical construct where the social forms part of who we are and 
these approaches seem to offer social psychologists the theoretical tools to start to 
appreciate how individual personality and social context are intimately connected.  
In the 1960s, behaviorism’s obsession with the outwardly observable became 
a failure to conceptualize inner mental states as psychology turned to 
cognition. Whereas experimental cognitivism continues to dominate the 
psychological landscape, the 1980s saw the start of a turn-to-language as 
psychologists took an interest in how context bound actions can be under- 
stood to construct and reconstruct our worlds. In UK social psychology, the 
turn-to-language – also known as the discursive turn – was marked by an 
audacious, innovative, and prescient (Marecek, 2002) strand, which some 
have argued highlights the possible irrelevance of mainstream social psy- 
chology (Bayer, 2002) because of its failure to adequately attempt to theorize 
the social (Leach, 2002). The now seminal publications Changing the 
Subject: Psychology, Social Regulation, and Subjectivity (Henriques, 
Hollway, Urwin, Venn, & Walkerdine, 1984) and Subjectivity and Method in 
Psychology: Gender, Meaning, and Science (Hollway, 1989) attempted to 
change the subject of psychology and the theory of subjectivity that 
psychology relied upon. The main critique was that mainstream psychology 
assumed a unitary rational subjectivity, which meant that the liberal concerns 
of psychologists  
were resulting in conservative practices focusing on the individual. To take 
one example, Crocker, Thompson, McGraw, and Ingerman (1987) conducted 
two studies that seemed motivated with a concern that prejudice is a 
pervasive detrimental social phenomenon. The general conclusion that can be 
drawn from Crocker et al.’s two studies is that people with low self-esteem 
are prejudiced towards higher status groups. The groups concerned were 
sororities. Notice how such research gloss over the social–political structures 
of those sororities and their differential status to suggest that prejudice is a 
result of low self-esteem. The implication seems to be that challenges to the 
social processes that may systematically and unfairly privilege one sorority 
over another should be replaced by attempts to make the marginalized 
happier or more confident.  
The discursive turn helped change the subject of, and the subjectivity 
(re)produced by, mainstream social psychology by focusing on language. 
Broadly, the focus was on what we do with language and what language does 
to us. The construction of subjectivity is one of the things we can do with 
language but, as socio-cultural phenomena beyond the control of any one 
person, language limits the possibilities open to us. As such, ‘subjectivity’ 
replaces personality as the key theoretical construct. There are two additional 
concepts: a discourse is a term for regularities in how something is spoken 
about, and the positions that a discourse constructs for different people are 
called ‘subject positions’. For example, Hollway (1989) persuasively 
demonstrates the construction of a discourse of a biological drive for sex that 
is underlined by an evolutionary need to reproduce in the talk of couples. The 
subject positions this discourse constructs would seem to be a male, at the 
whim of his sexual drive, actively seeking procreation, and a female, 
controlled by her drive to reproduce, passively waiting for procreation. 
Additionally, these subject positions would appear to exclude the possibility 
of homosexual and platonic heterosexual relations. Subject- ivity could 
therefore be the subject position we happen to inhabit at a particular point in 
time, but, below, we shall see that this may not be enough.  
Discursive methods have been particularly adept at changing the subject of 
psychology. For example, contemporary research on alcohol abuse in 
psychology could be driven by concerns of improving health, but there is a 
risk that the subject of such research will be limited to the individual drinker 
rather than the socio-political institutions that legitimize problematic 
drinking. That is, we may learn about how we consume alcohol (the people 
who drink too much alcohol, or their friends and family), while failing to 
consider how alcohol consumes society (not just by providing employment 
and profit but by constantly creating and recreating social structures that 
define who we are). In contrast, research on alcohol by Day, Gough, and 
McFadden (2004) moved beyond a social–individual dichotomized focus on 
health by using discursive methods to explore the constructions of women 
and drinking in the print media.  
Although questioning the discourses constructed by particularly powerful 
socio-political institutions, such as the print media, may be an important 
change in the subject of psychology, there is a difficulty with the subjectivity 
assumed by discursive methods. This is where a distinction between subject- 
ivity and subject position may be important. Subject positions are constructed 
through discourses but how do subject positions come to constitute a 
particular individual or individuals? It would seem that subjectivity is a blank 
atheoretical space (termed blank subjectivity by Parker, 1997a), waiting to be 
filled by subject positions. How, for example, do we come to have a history 
and a sense of a future if there is nothing to hold discourses in place? It is 
partly because of the difficulty with blank subjectivity that others have 
attempted to combine discursive methods with other theor- etical 
frameworks, such as phenomenology (Butt & Langdridge, 2003), personal 
construct theory (Burr & Butt, 1992), and psychoanalysis (Parker, 1997a).  
Psychoanalysis has a rich history of working within and against psychology 
(Frosh, 1989). For example, Roudinesco (1990), the historian, has 
highlighted that key figures in cognitive development psychology (Jean 
Piaget), experimental psychology (Edwin Boring), and neuropsychology 
(Alexander Luria) had links with, and undertook, psychoanalysis. Whereas 
the links between psychology and psychoanalysis have been largely erased 
from mainstream psychology (Parker, 1997a), some working within the turn-
to-language in the UK seem to have found psychoanalysis a fertile resource. 
When attempts to change the subject started in the 1980s, one of the main 
advantages psychoanalysis offered discursive methods was a framework for 
considering how we may be invested in a particular discourse. Since then, 
psychoanalysis and discursive methods have been combined in a variety of 
ways and it would be useful to consider how this has been done and the 
implications for the subject of, and the subjectivity assumed by, psychology, 
which is what I hope to do in this paper. Before, it is important to comment 
on the terminology that will be used to describe the different combinations of 
psychoanalysis and discourse analysis.  
Terminology  
In this paper, the terms ‘discursive’ and ‘discourse analytic’ are employed to 
capture a plethora of research, resulting from the turn-to-language in 
psychology, that has attempted to investigate discourse. Perhaps best known 
as ‘discourse analysis’, discursive methods can develop a bottom-up, top-
down, or eclectic analysis examining discourse. Bottom-up analyses (Potter 
& Wetherell, 1987) focus on how discourses are constructed by looking at the 
intricate details of the use of language. For example, a heterosexual man 
talking about his experience of a gay club says he ‘had a bloody good time’, 
but despite this emphatic remark, he reports thrice that the experience ‘didn’t 
really bother him’ (Speer & Potter, 2000; p. 549).  
Attending to the detail of what is said suggests that, first, the heterosexual 
man presents himself as not having any difficulty with homosexuality and 
therefore as not heterosexist. Second, the heterosexual man then distances 
himself from any suggestion that he may have homosexual desires with such 
repetition as to undermine the importance of his non-heterosexism. Top-
down analyses (Parker, 1992) focus on what discourses do to us by 
considering the implications of the subject positions that discourses construct, 
such as how the subject positions constructed by the discourse of a male 
sexual drive (Hollway, 1989) exclude the possibility of platonic heterosexual 
or homosexual relations. Eclectic analyses consider both the bottom-up use of 
language to construct discourse and the top-down consequences of discourse 
(Wetherell, 1998). When considering how psychoanalysis has been combined 
with discursive methods, it is important to attend to the type of discourse 
analysis used.  
Finding a term that encompasses the variety of combinations of 
psychoanalysis and discourse analysis is a little more difficult. ‘Psycho- 
discursive’ (Wetherell & Edley, 1999) usefully prefixes a discursive 
approach with a concern for theorizing subjectivity but this is not limited to 
the use of psychoanalysis. ‘Psycho-social’ (Hollway, 2004) prefixes the 
social with the ‘psycho’ but this is limited neither to the use of discourse 
analysis nor psychoanalysis. While unwieldy, ‘psychoanalytically informed 
discourse analysis’ does focus on psychoanalysis, but it does suggest that 
discourse analysis is the most primary, which, as we shall see, is not always 
the case. ‘Critical transformative psychoanalytic discourse analysis’ (Parker, 
1997a) may be useful for encapsulating the broad array of approaches, but 
few are likely to recognize it as such. Perhaps the possibility that ‘psycho-
discursive’ may include frameworks other than psychoanalysis makes it the 
best term because it helps avoid essentializing psychoanalysis. That is, 
psychoanalysis does not have to be used as if it is advocating biological 
determinism. Just as psychoanalysis may succeed or fail in explaining why a 
specific subject position comes to constitute an individual at a particular time, 
so too may other psychological approaches. Furthermore, there are a number 
of schools of psychoanalysis that may have less in common with each other 
than they do with other theoretical frameworks, which means that psycho-
discursive should help avoid conflating different psychoanalytic perspectives. 
Indeed, as with the type of discourse analysis used, it is also important to 
consider the school of psychoanalysis drawn upon.  
Consequently, the aim of the paper is to review psycho-discursive approaches 
that have developed in UK social psychology since the publication of 
Changing the Subject (Henriques et al., 1984) and Subjectivity and Method in 
Psychology (Hollway, 1989). Throughout, this paper will refer to the specific 
turn-to-language in UK social psychology as the project to change the 
subject. In addition, this paper shall consider the type of discourse analysis 
and psychoanalysis the psycho-discursive approaches draw upon. 
Unfortunately, with such a rich body of work related to the project to  
change the subject, it is beyond the scope of this paper to review all the 
psycho-discursive work in UK social psychology. Instead, this paper will 
consider one approach that takes the type of discourse analysis as its main 
focus [Approach II: Psychoanalytic Discursive Psychology (PDP)] and 
another approach where psychoanalytic perspective used is primary 
(Approach III: Lacanian excursions into social psychology). As a 
continuation of Wendy Hollway’s work in Subjectivity & Method in 
Psychology, the Free-Association Narrative Interview method (FANI) is 
perhaps the psycho-discursive approach more clearly aligned to changing the 
subject than PDP and Lacanian Psychoanalysis. As such, it is to FANI that 
this paper turns first.  
Approach I: Free Association Narrative Interview Method  
Wendy Hollway’s Subjectivity & Method in Psychology (1989) drew upon 
individual and couple interviews as well as her own diary and personal 
accounts to develop what is now seen as a seminal examination of 
subjectivity in psychology. In this book, Hollway’s key analyses are formed 
through the use of a broadly top-down discourse analysis and aspects of the 
German psychoanalyst, Melanie Klein, and French psychoanalyst, Jacques 
Lacan. Since then, Hollway’s collaboration with Tony Jefferson seems to 
have resulted in a more formal psycho-discursive approach (Hollway & 
Jefferson, 2000). Termed the Free Association Narrative Interview method – 
or FANI for short – this approach can be separated into two parts: data 
collection and analysis.  
FANI: Data collection  
As the name suggests, FANI collects data through the use of interviews, 
which employ semi-structured questions around a research topic to allow the 
interviewee to free associate their own answers or narrative(s). As the focus 
of the interviews is to elicit narrative, an interview schedule may include as 
few as three to five main questions for 1 to 2 hours of interview. The 
questions will probably be biographical in approach by asking the 
interviewee to relate the research topic to their own life history. For example, 
a study on violence may ask, ‘can you tell me about a time when violence has 
been an issue in your life’. The first interview is then followed up with a 
second, one to two weeks later, to explore further questions or seek 
clarification, and to offer the interviewee the opportunity to raise anything 
that has come to mind. The biographical slant and the double interview 
process produce what could be called case studies. Whereas multiple 
researchers can collaborate to conduct interviews on the same research 
project, the same researcher would usually conduct the follow-up inter- view. 
Researchers are not easily interchangeable because the analysis looks at the 
interaction in the interview and not just the responses of the interviewee.  
FANI: Data Analysis  
The second step of the FANI approach is to develop an analysis of the data 
using Kleinian psychoanalytic theory. This would be started after the first 
interview to help develop questions for the second interview. Much of 
Klein’s work is based upon the analysis of children, where a child’s display 
of love and hate towards the same person, particularly the mother, was 
important. Klein (1952) observed that the warmth and comfort offered by a 
mother seemed to be immensely satisfying for the child but the mother could 
also be experienced as a source of frustration. For example, a mother could 
not realistically provide comfort all the time, and the baby may experience 
loss as comfort is taken away or a demand remains, however momentarily, 
unmet. At first, this may result in ambivalence towards the mother but would 
become anxiety as the child split off and projected the bad, frustrating parts 
onto the mother, growing to resent her more and yet fearing self-destruction 
because the child feels so bound up with the mother. The splitting of the bad 
(frustrating) from the good (comfort providing) and the projection of the bad 
onto the mother are defenses to deal with the anxiety that characterize the 
paranoid-schizoid position (ibid). As the child matures, it can be expected to 
move towards a more complex position where it recognizes that the good and 
bad are within the mother at the same time, which is termed the depressive 
position. Although the paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions can be 
understood as developmental stages, Klein (see, Laplanche & Pontalis, 1983) 
theorizes that we return to them throughout life. Contemporary psychologists 
may be more likely to know of the pioneering work of Bowlby than of 
Kleinian psychoanalysis, but attachment theory echoes a similar focus on the 
relationship between mother and infant and how anxiety is successfully (or 
not) managed in the relationship. Utilizing these principles, the analysis step 
of the FANI approach is particularly concerned with both what the 
interviewee says about their childhood and what happens between the 
interviewer and interviewee.  
FANI: Uses & example  
Since being first used to examine fear of crime (Hollway & Jefferson, 2001), 
FANI has been used to explore male violence against women (Gadd, 2000, 
2003), violence against men (Gadd, Farrall, Dallimore, & Lombard, 2003; 
Gadd, 2004a), and theoretical issues, such as agency (Hollway & Jefferson, 
2005) and interviewee–interviewer dynamics (Gadd, 2004b). Gadd’s (2004a) 
work on male violence against women is apposite because it provides case 
studies from men attending an anti-violence program where mainstream 
social psychology is particularly influential. These programs (e.g., Dobash, 
Dobash, Cavanagh, & Lewis, 1996) combine behavioral notions that violence 
is ‘learned’ and ‘intentional’ with a cognitive perspective to ‘re-education’  
where clients could be persuaded, such as through correcting their cognitive 
distortions, to see that their behavior amounts to abuse and that they have to 
be responsible for their behavior. Gadd (2004a) seems to argue that these 
programs assume an unduly simplistic subjectivity where denial succeeds in 
mitigating awareness and responsibility for violence. One case study is of 
Paul, a 33-year-old intimidating, visibly disabled, troubled man who is 
violent to his wife. Paul found out about an anti-violence program after 
asking his ex-probation worker for help. As Paul reported seeking help to end 
his violence and was explicit that his wife ‘Karen’ was ‘not there to be 
punched and battered’ (ibid, p. 186), it would seem cognitive–behavioral 
notions usually utilized here fail to explain Paul’s behavior because he was 
not in denial about his abuse. FANI was utilized to theorize a complex 
subjectivity driven by the avoidance of anxiety where the individual and 
social are merged. Gadd (ibid) argues that Paul is not denying his violence 
through cognitive distortion, but that Paul’s violence is an act of denial that 
succeeds in obliterating anxiety about his failure to become an acceptable 
husband and father. As such, Paul is understood as motivated to suppress his 
failure to meet social expectations to provide for his family. Hence, Paul’s 
violence requires going beyond cognitive–behavioral notions to develop an 
understanding of the society of which he is a part as well as an understanding 
his individuality.  
FANI: Overview  
The FANI approach uses individual free association narrative interviews to 
develop biographical case studies, which are analyzed using Kleinian 
psychoanalytic theory. Although the main text on FANI does suggest that it is 
an approach committed to individual interviews as a source of data – which 
may not be particularly surprising given the predominance of inter- views in 
qualitative research (Potter & Hepburn, 2005) or the dominance of individual 
psychoanalysis – it may be incorrect to assume a rigid relationship between 
data collection and analysis in this approach. Indeed, both Hollway and 
Jefferson, the original proponents of FANI, have developed Kleinian analyses 
– of date rape (Hollway & Jefferson, 1998) and Mike Tyson (Jefferson, 1997) 
– using a range of materials. Nevertheless, the approach does seem to focus 
on cases of individuals and, even if it does look at how anxiety is worked up 
interrelationally, does suggest the anxiety and any defenses for dealing with it 
belong to the individual. Even worse, FANI would seem to risk leaving the 
individual as, unaware of their unconscious anxiety, victims of their own 
defenses. Given the focus on interrelational subjectivity from the FANI 
approach, focusing on an individual in data collection seems to suggest that 
to answer any questions – for example, why did Paul, mentioned above, use 
violence as an act of denial rather than using another defense mechanism 
such as splitting – we need to delve deeper into the individual by returning to 
ask them more questions, and this seems to privilege the  
individual. It is certainly plausible for researchers to draw upon other 
methods of data collection, such as Gough’s (2004) Kleinian analysis of 
focus groups. In addition, researchers could still focus on a single individual 
without solely relying on interviews by utilizing archive material. The next 
psycho-discursive approach, PDP (Billig, 2006a), is one that, like FANI, 
considers an individual’s biography in-depth but primarily through the use of 
archive materials.  
Approach II: Psychoanalytic Discursive Psychology  
In Arguing and Thinking: A Rhetorical Approach to Social Psychology, 
Michael Billig (1987) added to the discursive turn a focus on how 
psychological processes occur within dialogue and, particularly, where talk 
includes contradictions, disputes, dilemmas, or, as the title of the book 
suggests, argument. However, Billig was well aware that in focusing on what 
is said in dialogue he was ignoring those things that dialogue successfully 
avoids, which led to a reconsideration of Freud’s work using the tools of the 
discursive turn where, for example, repression was reworked as something 
that is achieved within dialogue (Billig, 1999). Having argued that psycho- 
logical and psychoanalytic processes occur within language, Billig has 
developed an approach, termed Psychoanalytic Discursive Psychology (PDP; 
Billig, 2006a), for considering them together.  
PDP: Data collection  
Unlike the FANI approach, PDP has given little time to explicitly considering 
it methods of data collection. The work of Billig’s that seems to have led to 
the development of PDP (primarily Billig, 1999) takes great pains to explore 
archive material around a particular ‘case’, which is often, but not solely, 
Freud. In the introduction to Arguing & Thinking, Billig is unashamedly 
bookish; ‘the antiquarian suffers from uncontrollable urges to wander from 
the laboratory to the library. Passages from old and not-so-old books are 
haphazardly read, noted and thus collected, in a way a modern psychologist 
might think pathological’ (Billig, 1987; p. 32). There is certainly no reason to 
suggest that PDP should limit itself to archive materials, but it does highlight 
that almost any material linked to a case can be a useful source of research 
material. Moving from interviews to archives as sources of data can seem 
counterintuitive, however, given that, as we shall see, the discursive element 
in PDP has tended to privilege capturing live communication.  
PDP: Data analysis  
As the name PDP suggests, the approach to analysis it takes is built upon 
Discursive Psychology (Edwards & Potter, 1992), which produces bottom-up  
analyses considering the minutia of interaction and how language is used to 
construct and achieve things. Discursive Psychologists (e.g., Potter & 
Hepburn, 2005) seem to favor explorations of interaction turn-by-turn and 
have been critical of research ignoring interactional aspects of interviews and 
desiring abandonment of interviews as a method of data collection altogether. 
However, Billig (2006a) would seem to have found that the focus on 
interaction in Discursive Psychology wanting because it directs attention 
away from the larger context in which that interaction occurs, which has led 
him to rework Freudian psychoanalysis to consider how ideology works in 
interaction. Giving too little consideration to socio-political context is also a 
common difficulty for mainstream social psychology. More specifically, 
turn-by-turn analyses of interaction have so far focused on what is said while 
ignoring the possibility that one function of a particular interaction could be 
to avoid saying something. As such, Billig (1999) has reworked the Freudian 
psychoanalytic notion of repression as something that can be evidenced from 
the intricate detail of language. It would seem, therefore, that the data 
analysis favored by the PDP approach is a bottom-up discourse analysis that 
pays particular attention to how things are not said and the implications of not 
saying them.  
PDP: Uses & example  
As PDP was first developed through a reformulation of Freud, it has 
primarily been used to examine particular aspects of Freud’s case studies to 
develop an argument for a discursive repression. In particular, Rat Man 
(Freud, 1909b) is used to consider how repression occurs in internal dialogue; 
Little Hans (Freud, 1909a) is used to show how children learn to repress as 
they learn to talk; and Elizabeth von R. (Freud, 1895) shows that we can be 
unaware of our own emotions because emotions are socially constructed. 
Having used these case studies to provide an argument for a discursive 
understanding of repression, Billig turns to the case study of Dora to present 
an analysis of Freud’s own repression. Specifically, Billig (1999) argues that 
Freud’s case study of Dora (1905) represses consideration of the oppression 
under which Jews lived in Austria at the time. In the case history, Freud 
mentions that Dora had difficulty explaining why she spent two hours 
looking at Raphael’s painting of Madonna. A footnote in the case study is 
used by Freud to offer an interpretation, which emphasizes that the example 
is not important for the main theme of the text. In addition, the footnote 
focuses on the sexual aspect (virgin mother) of the Madonna viewing. Billig 
points out that the example is of a Jewish girl looking at an image of the 
Christians who would have been, in the name of Christianity, oppressing 
almost everyone Dora (and Freud) knew at the time. Consequently, 
repression of anti-semitism is achieved discursively, through minimization of 
relevant material (to a footnote) and then avoidance. As such, an 
understanding of subjectivity is developed using a psychoanalytic–  
discursive framework (in this case, discursive repression) by drawing upon 
archive material, which is, importantly, contextualized historically. For 
mainstream social psychology, such analyses highlight the importance of the 
subtly that experiments are so often deliberately designed prevent. Indeed, 
even those that may be unconvinced by the utility of PDP will surely be 
unable to deny that it shows the potential of reflecting on social– 
psychological scholarship and considering what it has avoided and how.  
PDP: Overview  
PDP utilizes archive material to develop case studies, which are analyzed 
using a discursive interpretation of psychoanalytic theory. The crux of the 
PDP approach is the focus and care it takes in analyzing the archived 
discourse, and there is no reason that the archive material could not be 
supplemented by interviews with the particular cases. The extreme focus on 
language risks, in the words of Frosh (2002), a ‘flattening out’ of experience. 
That is, PDP limits our understanding of subjectivity to what can be 
evidenced from our uses of language, but this fails to account for those times 
when words seem to fail to do justice to lived experience, or when remaining 
silent seems preferable to attempting to express our experience (Frosh, 2001). 
Flattening out experience is a limitation common to bottom- up discourse 
analyses, but perhaps PDP’s attempts to utilize this perspective on discourse 
to examine what-is-not-said makes it stand out. Instead of trying to 
understand what cannot be said, PDP would seem to at least offer an 
approach for examining how what-is-not-said is not said. Interestingly, 
although PDP has so far been used on Freudian psychoanalytic theory, it is 
not presented as necessarily aligned to any particular psychoanalytic school. 
However, Billig (1999) is at pains to avoid the Lacanian psychoanalytic 
school of thought, but, as Parker (2001) has noted, both PDP and Lacanian 
psychoanalysis seem theoretically aligned by an understanding that each time 
something is said something is also not said. This will be explored in more 
detail in the third and final approach.  
Approach III: Lacanian Excursions into Social Psychology  
In his book Psychoanalytic Cultures: Psychoanalytic Discourse in Western 
Society, Ian Parker (1997b) takes great care with a broad array of 
psychoanalytic theorists and demonstrates how, in particular contexts, their 
work has come to be taken for granted as understandings of ourselves. That 
is, for how psychoanalytic concepts structure subjectivity. Parker can be 
understood as broadly treating psychoanalysis as a discourse and, therefore, 
Psychoanalytic Culture is psycho-discursive in its combination of 
psychoanalysis and discourse analysis. Since then, Parker has initiated a 
program of work on the French psychoanalytic theorist, Jacques Lacan, 
considering the potential and dangers of Lacanian psychoanalysis for, 
broadly, social psychology  
 (e.g., 2003, 2005a). Parker’s program of work does not seek to establish a 
methodology like FANI or PDP, nor is Parker alone as a number of scholars 
(e.g., Branney, 2006; Georgaca, 2001; Hollway, 1989; Walkerdine, 1987) 
have drawn upon discursive theory and Lacanian psychoanalysis. The term, 
‘Lacanian excursions into social psychology’, best encapsulates the multiple 
uses of Lacanian psychoanalysis in this approach. Rather than drawing upon 
all these excursions, concentrating on Parker’s work will provide a focus for 
considering how to collect data and develop an analysis.  
Lacanian excursions: Data collection  
Like Billig, Parker has utilized archive materials and rarely draws upon 
interview or focus group data. Unlike both Hollway and Billig, Parker almost 
never develops a ‘case’ of a particular individual, although Parker’s book on 
the contentious Slovenian thinker, Slavoj Žižek (2004), could be understood 
as an extensive case study. Parker’s approach to data collection could be 
thought of as broadly drawing upon archive materials around particular issues 
rather than specific individuals. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to think 
that this is the definitive suggestion for data collection in Lacanian 
psychoanalysis because the Lacanian work preceding Parker’s engagement 
with Lacanian psychoanalytic theory could also be included. Indeed, as a 
clinical method it is not surprising to find clinical case studies combining 
Lacanian psychoanalysis and discourse analysis (Georgaca, 2001, 2003). 
Consequently, it would seem that Lacanian psychoanalysis is potentially 
open to all possibilities of data collection, although it is difficult to see how 
the experimental approach of mainstream psychology to data collection 
would fit. Although this does mean that there is little general guidance to 
offer on what data to use and why, considerations of data collection are 
perhaps best developed in parallel with conceptual development in the data 
analysis.  
Lacanian excursions: Data analysis  
For Lacan, the unconscious is structured like a language (Lacan, 1998; p. 48), 
which seems to chime with Billig’s notion that each time something is said, 
something is also not said and the unconscious could be that which remains 
unsaid as part of our entry into language. Lacan is commonly referred to as a 
post-structuralist, but structure seems particularly important. Specifically, the 
structural relations constituted by, and constituting, language are fundamental 
for understanding subjectivity. Nevertheless, Lacanian psychoanalysis does 
not offer a comprehensive theory, and it would be difficult to select any 
concepts that could either introduce Lacanian psychoanalysis or provide the 
foundation of data analysis. The writing of Lacan and many Lacanians is 
notoriously obscure, and it can be difficult enough to read never mind to 
figure out how Lacanian psychoanalysis  
could be used to change the subjectivity assumed by, and the subject of, 
psychology. Instead, specific Lacanian concepts could offer the starting point 
for an excursion into some aspect of social psychology. Along the way, the 
concept, or concepts, used may be found wanting, in need of devel- opment, 
or the path taken may need redirecting. Parker’s (2005a) description of the 
seven elements of Lacanian psychoanalytic theory that are relatively 
compatible with discursive theory certainly provides a useful start.  
Lacanian excursions: Uses & example  
Lacanian psychoanalysis has been used to examine the production of girls’ 
desire in comics (Walkerdine, 1987), heterosexual subjectivity in interviews 
and a journal (Hollway, 1989), views of the self in long-term psychotherapy 
(Georgaca, 2001, 2003), and understandings of domestic violence in 
government policy (Branney, 2006). A particularly useful example is where 
Parker (2003) reworks Lacanian psychoanalytic notions to comment on the 
relation between psychology and Lacanian psychoanalysis. For Lacan, we are 
symbolic beings who draw upon language to understand our world and 
ourselves, which means that self-knowledge is always socially mediated and 
full self-consciousness is impossible. Note how discursive theory seems to be 
already included in Lacanian theory, as any self-knowledge would always be 
a social construction and true self-conscious theoretically irrelevant. To use 
Lacanian terminology, we are barred subjects, barred from knowing 
ourselves. As Parker (ibid) highlights, the barred subject is useful for 
considering the relation between social psychology and Lacanian 
psychoanalysis. More specifically, Parker suggests that Lacan is a barred 
psychologist because Lacanian concepts are sometimes so antithetical to 
psychology that they prevent development of the understanding of 
subjectivity psychologists so often seek. As such, Lacanian psychoanalysis 
offers particularly alluring excursions into social psychology that may 
already combine discursive theory but are likely to represent a serious 
challenge to the research enterprise.  
Lacanian excursions: Overview  
Lacanian excursions into social psychology usually draw upon a specific 
Lacanian concept, or concepts, to reconsider a particular aspect of social 
psychology. As the theoretical terrain offered by Lacan and other Lacanians 
is so different to social psychology, there is certainly a great potential for 
Lacanian excursions to change the way we think about and research different 
aspects of social psychology. While the term ‘excursion’ might summon up 
the image of a walk over a few hills, the work of Lacan is willfully obscure, 
often arrogant, and difficult to read. For Billig (2006b), Lacan not only places 
obscurity over clarity but, as can be evidenced from Lacan’s often misleading 
citation practices, is contemptuous of scholarly activities. For  
anyone considering turning to Lacanian psychoanalysis, they are unlikely to 
find a text that will help them easily assimilate Lacan’s teachings. Lacanian 
psychoanalysis does not provide a theory of subjectivity that, if only we 
could understand it, would provide real understanding of ourselves. Rather, 
the obscurity of Lacanian texts encourages questioning, disagreement, and 
further inquiry, which may lead to a more fruitful process. As such, Lacanian 
excursions have the potential to radically change the subject of, and 
subjectivity assumed by, psychology.  
Conclusion  
UK social psychology has been marked by an innovative strand of work that 
has attempted to change the subjectivity assumed by, and the subject of, 
psychology. Dropping personality as a theoretical concept, FANI, PDP, and 
Lacanian excursions into social psychology can be understood as three 
different approaches to combining psychoanalysis and discourse analysis to 
theorize an alternative subjectivity. FANI is the psycho-discursive approach 
emerging most obviously from the project to change the subject in the 1980s 
and utilizes interviews and Kleinian psychoanalytic theory to develop case 
studies. PDP uses discursive theory to the greatest extent to develop cases by 
analyzing archive materials and using a discursively reworked psychoanalytic 
conception of repression to consider what-is-not-said and how. In contrast, 
the benefits of discourse analysis are already present in Lacanian excursions, 
but it is much more difficult to capture how Lacanian psychoanalysis should 
be done.  
A difficulty for psycho-discursive approaches is the issue of warranting, 
which can be broken down into (i) whether the particular issue analyzed 
warrants analysis and (ii) whether the analysis provided is warranted by the 
material. Frosh and Emerson (2005) provide an extremely useful discussion 
of the warranting of an analysis, or interpretation, by providing psycho-
discursive and discursive interpretations of the same material. They conclude 
that psychoanalytic interpretations require more grounding, but it is not clear 
what constitutes more and what enough is. Indeed, warranting is an issue for 
all interpretative methods that is difficult to counter and where we find a 
psycho-discursive analysis that we think is not warranted it is important to 
attempt to explain why and to provide an example (which does not 
necessarily have to be psycho-discursive) that we think is warranted.  
In relation to warranting, some currents evident in the three approaches 
reviewed seem counter-intuitive. Both FANI and PDP seem to be estab- 
lishing set methodologies that can be applied to certain aspects of social 
psychology. Establishing a method does allow a researcher to develop 
something tangible that can not only be used to conduct research but could 
become a focus for research methods courses taught to social scientists 
globally. As a particular analysis is developed, the researcher may go to great 
lengths to fit their data to the methodology or, which is more likely,  
as the researcher develops an analysis they will become immersed in the 
theoretical aspects such that they come to see and understand themselves and 
the world in that particular way. I would argue that establishing a 
methodology as a tool that can be wielded will only limit the potential for 
innovative research and will quell the audacious character of much psycho-
discursive research. Certainly, having a variety of approaches from which to 
draw upon will help as they offer methodological texts and specific analyses 
for comparison. Parker (2005b) uses the metaphor of the recipe to explain 
how one could undertake an analysis, and Branney (2006) uses a read-
analysis-supervision cycle that may help students and research teams. 
Nevertheless, psychoanalytic texts, and not just Lacanian texts, can be 
extremely difficult to engage with and establishing a methodology seems to 
offer an easy way out but would risk undoing much of the work attempting to 
change the subject of, and subjectivity assumed by, psychology.  
What these three approaches show is that the radical ferment of the turn-to-
language and, particularly, attempts to change the subject are still taking 
shape, leading to some of the most interesting and engaging, if not difficult, 
scholarship within, and on the margins of, psychology. For all three 
approaches, issues of prejudice, for example, are not the subject of an 
individual’s perception as for each; subjectivity is intimately social, where 
the social forms part of the very structure of subjectivity. With such a rich 
history, it is difficult to imagine how these approaches will continue to 
develop. We can certainly hope to see more work from Hollway, Billig, and 
Parker – presented in this paper as the main proponents of each approach – 
but the most interesting question would seem to be how other scholars will 
utilize these approaches. Perhaps some or all of the approaches will be taken 
up by psychologists en masse. Midgley (2006) suggests that greater 
interaction between psychoanalysis and psychology will enrich both fields, 
although it is more likely that psycho-discursive approaches will remain on 
the margins, but maybe this is where the most interesting work is to be 
produced.  
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